Development and Implementation of an HSE Management System in Exploration and Production Companies
- P.D. Bentley (Shell IntI. Petroleum Mij. B.V.) | D.L. Mundhenk (Shell IntI. Petroleum Mij. B.V.) | M.G. Jones (Shell IntI. Petroleum Mij. B.V.) | Geert de Jong (Shell IntI. Petroleum Mij. B.V.)
- Document ID
- Society of Petroleum Engineers
- Journal of Petroleum Technology
- Publication Date
- January 1995
- Document Type
- Journal Paper
- 54 - 60
- 1995. Society of Petroleum Engineers
- 6.3.3 Operational Safety, 4.5.5 Installation Equipment and Techniques, 6.1.1 HSSE Management Systems, 4.1.2 Separation and Treating, 7.2.1 Risk, Uncertainty and Risk Assessment, 6.3.7 Safety Risk Management, 4.1.5 Processing Equipment, 1.6 Drilling Operations, 6.1.2 HSSE Reporting, 6.1 HSSE & Social Responsibility Management
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This paper describes the experience to date with safety management systems (SMS's) and describes their implementation after the Piper Alpha disaster and Lord Cullen's report. It also shows the gradual expansion of these systems toward fully integrated health, safety, and environment (HSE) management systems. Our company policy, which was clearly stated before publication of Lord Cullen's report, is that work should not start until the appropriate controls are in place. Work based on this policy and on objective-setting SMS's within Shell IntI. Petroleum Mij. (SIPM) E&P coordination started in earnest soon after the publication of the report in Nov. 1990 and has continued without interruption since that time. Objective-setting systems may be defined as systems where the company management sets its own objectives or goals on the basis of functional rather than prescriptive requirements and then goes on to demonstrate how such goals have been, or are being, met. The paper ends with a projection of what may be expected in the future.
Following the Piper Alpha disaster and the in-depth public inquiry led by Lord Cullen, the recommendation was made that all offshore installations on the U.K. continental shelf should have safety cases similar to those already required under the U.K. Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards Regulations. This recommendation was given effect by means of the safety-case regulation within the U.K. with a Nov. 1993 deadline for the submission of safety cases. Shell Expro, as a major operator in the U.K. sector of the North Sea, had already begun work on its safety cases before publication of the Cullen report and was one of the companies that contributed to the so called "voluntary" safety cases before this date.
It was apparent to E&P management within SIPM that the SMS and the safety case provided better assurance of safe operation and were of real value to Shell operations worldwide. (In this paper, Shell is sometimes used for E&P companies of the Royal Dutch/ Shell group in general, and Shell E&P is used if experience was gained through technical service agreements supported by SIPM E&P). It was also clear that a worldwide move toward such systems would take place. Thus, application of these systems was both good business and appropriate for all Shell E&P operating companies. As a direct consequence, an integrated project team (both project engineering and operations) was set up to implement SMS and safety cases throughout Shell upstream operations worldwide.
|File Size||647 KB||Number of Pages||6|