Is There a Place for High-Reliability Organizations in Drilling?
- John Thorogood (Drilling Global Consultant LLP)
- Document ID
- Society of Petroleum Engineers
- SPE Drilling & Completion
- Publication Date
- September 2013
- Document Type
- Journal Paper
- 263 - 269
- 2013. Society of Petroleum Engineers
- 1.6 Drilling Operations, 6.1.5 Human Resources, Competence and Training
- 1 in the last 30 days
- 547 since 2007
- Show more detail
- View rights & permissions
|SPE Member Price:||USD 10.00|
|SPE Non-Member Price:||USD 30.00|
Research on high-reliability organizations was originally carried out withaircraft carriers and nuclear submarines. Essentially, this involved relativelyclosed communities, with a high operational tempo at which mistakes could haveextremely serious and direct consequences. In these cases, rapid learning was abyproduct of personnel rotation and the need to train successors. Recentresearch suggests that high-reliability organizations have five importantcharacteristics: a preoccupation with failure, a reluctance to simplify,sensitivity to operations, resilience, and a respect for expertise. It is notimmediately obvious that these qualities are an inherent part of the culture ofthe organizations that manage drilling operations today. The thesis of thispaper is that these five traits taken together can prevent drilling operationsfrom drifting into failures caused by the complexity of the organizationsinvolved in conceptualizing, planning, and executing drilling operations,including the management environment in which they are set. This paperconsiders how apparently successful organizations can "drift into failure," inpart, as a result of the consequences of organizational complexity. These ideasset the scene for a review of high-reliability-organization theory and suggestways in which the principles might be applied to the management of drillingoperations.
|File Size||218 KB||Number of Pages||7|
Baker, K. 2011. Personal Communication.
Borthwick, D. 2010. Report of the Montara Commission of Inquiry,Commonwealth of Australia.
Chief Counsel's Report. 2011. Macondo: The Gulf Oil Disaster, NationalCommission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling.
Crichton, M., Henderson, W.G., and Thorogood, J.L. 2004. Command Skills forDrilling and Completion Teams, Paper SPE 89901 presented at the SPE TechnicalConference and Exhibition, Houston, Texas, 26-29 September. http://dx.doi.org/10.2118/89901-MS.
Dekker, S. 2006. The Field Guide to Understanding Human Error. Burlington,Vermont: Ashgate Publishing.
Dekker, S. 2011. Drift Into Failure: From Hunting Broken Components toUnderstanding Complex Systems. Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing.
Flin, R. and Arbuthnot, K. 2002. Incident Command: Tales From the HotSeat. Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing.
Flin, R., O'Connor, P., and Crichton, M. 2007. Safety at the Sharp End:An Introduction to Non-Technical Skills. Burlington, Vermont: AshgatePublishing.
Hopkins, A. 2005. Safety Culture and Risk, CCH Australia Ltd.
Hopkins, A. 2007. The Problem of Defining High Reliability Organisations,Working Paper No. 51, National Research Centre of OHS Regulation, Australia. http://ohs.anu.edu.au/publications/index.php.
Hopkins, A. 2010a. Failure to Learn: The BP Texas City Refinery Disaster,CCH Australia Ltd.
Hopkins, A. 2010b. Risk Management and Rule Compliance Decision-making inHazardous Industries, Working Paper No. 72, National Research Centre of OHSRegulation, Australia, http://ohs.anu.edu.au/publications/index.php.
Hopkins, A. 2011. Management Walk-Arounds: Lessons From the Gulf of MexicoOil Well Blowout, Working Paper No. 79, National Research Centre of OHSRegulation, Australia. http://ohs.anu.edu.au/publications/index.php.
Kreb, J. 2013. Post Macondo Recommendations Presentation, Center forOffshore Safety, First Annual Forum, 29 April.
Lekka, C. 2011. High Reliability Organisations: A Review of the Literature,UK Health and Safety Executive, Research Report No. RR899.
NSTB. 2000. National Transportation Safety Board, Factual Report: Aviation(DCA00MA023), Douglas MD-83, N963AS, Port Hueneme, California, 31 January.Washington, DC: NSTB.
OGP. 2011. Deepwater Wells: Lessons and Recommendations. InternationalAssociation of Oil and Gas Producers, Global Industry ResponseGroup.www.ogp.org.uk/pubs/463.pdf.
OGP. 2012. Cognitive Issues Associated With Process Safety and EnvironmentalIncidents, Report No. 460, July. www.ogp.org.uk/pubs/460.pdf.
Reason, J.T. 1997. Managing the Risks of Organisational Accidents.Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing.
Reason, J.T. 2008. The Human Contribution: Unsafe Acts, Accidents andHeroic Recoveries. Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing.
Smith, P., Kincannon, H., Lehnert, R. et al. 2013. Human Error Analysis ofthe Macondo Well Blowout. Process Safety Progress 32 (2):217-221. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/prs.11604.
Snook, S. 2000. Friendly Fire: The Accidental Shootdown of U.S. BlackHawks Over Northern Iraq. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Thorogood, J.L. and Crichton, M.T. 2013. Operational Control and ManagingChange: The Integration of Non-Technical Skills With WorkplaceProcedures. SPE Drill & Compl 28 (2): 203-211. http://dx.doi.org/10.2118/163489-PA.
TSBC. 2003. Transportation Safety Board of Canada, Aviation InvestigationReport: In-Flight Fire Leading to Collision With Water. Swissair MD-11 HB-IWF,Peggy's Cove, Nova Scotia 5nm SW, 2 September 1998 (Report Number A98H0003).Quebec TSB.
Vaughan, D. 1996. The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology,Culture and Deviance At NASA. Chicago, Illinois: University of ChicagoPress.
Weick, K.E. and Sutcliffe, K.M. 2007. Managing the Unexpected, ResilientPerformance in an Age of Uncertainty. New York: Jossey-Bass (John Wiley& Sons, Inc.). ISBN 978-0-7879-9649-9.
Woods, D.D., Dekker, S., Cook, R. et al. 2010. Behind Human Error.Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing.