Proactive Indicators To Control Risks in Operations of Oil and Gas Fields
- Stig Ole Johnsen (Norwegian University of Science and Technology) | Eivind Okstad (Norwegian University of Science and Technology) | Andreas L. Aas (JBV) | T. Skramstad (Norwegian University of Science and Technology)
- Document ID
- Society of Petroleum Engineers
- SPE Economics & Management
- Publication Date
- April 2012
- Document Type
- Journal Paper
- 90 - 105
- 2012. Society of Petroleum Engineers
- 6.1 HSSE & Social Responsibility Management, 6.1.2 HSSE Reorting, 6.6.1 Integrating HSSE into the Business, 7.2.1 Risk, Uncertainty and Risk Assessment
- safety, security and resilience
- 2 in the last 30 days
- 1,052 since 2007
- Show more detail
- View rights & permissions
|SPE Member Price:||USD 10.00|
|SPE Non-Member Price:||USD 30.00|
Because of the increased need for oil and gas, new and more-demanding oil fields must be explored in sensitive and challenging areas. Exploration of expert knowledge and new technology must be employed in these challenging situations. This collaboration and use of new technology introduces new ways of operating oil and gas fields. These new practices are often called "field of the future" or integrated operations (IO). These new practices are being implemented on the Norwegian continental shelf, leading to increased hydrocarbon recovery and changes in operations and maintenance. These practices may impact health, safety, and environment (HSE), but should not increase the risks of major accidents or influence HSE in a negative manner.
In this paper, we are suggesting a set of proactive indicators to ensure that risks are controlled when IO is implemented and operated. A proactive indicator is used as a measure of risk, to be controlled in risk management. The indicators have been developed on the basis of analysis of accidents, exploration of theory, and interviews and discussions in collaboration with the oil and gas industry.
Our suggested approach is to develop and explore indicators in close collaboration with key stakeholders to increase understanding and control of the relevant risks. Resilience and successful recoveries are not sufficiently explored in the reviewed accident reports, thus accident investigations should include reflections on reasons of successful recoveries and why the incident or accident did not have greater consequences.
The three most important causal factors of incidents seem to be poor design and poor validation of equipment, poor risk analysis of critical operations, and deviations from established procedures. A causal factor important in remote operations is miscommunication between actors during critical operations. Several proactive indicators are suggested, among them the level of exploration of safety cases during design and risk perception among stakeholders involved in operations. Important indicators in remote operations are suggested to be the assessment of shared communication and shared risk perceptions when critical tasks are distributed.
To validate the indicators, we are correlating the indicators with actual HSE levels. In addition, the indicators should be correlated to indirect measures (e.g., safety culture and risk perceptions) where appropriate.
|File Size||954 KB||Number of Pages||16|
Alteren, B., Sveen, J., Guttormsen, G., Madsen, B.-E., Klev, R., and Helgesen, O. 2004. "Smarter Together" in Offsore Drilling - a Successful ActionResearch Project? In Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management 2004(PSAM 7 - ESREL '04), ed. C. Spitzer, U. Schmocker, and V.N. Dang, Vol. 1,1302-1308. London: Springer-Verlag.
Antonsen, S., Ramstad, L.R., and Kongsvik, T. 2007. Unlocking theOrganization: Action Research as Means of Improving Organizational Safety.Safety Science Monitor 11 (1): Article 4.
Argyris, C. and Schön, D.A. 1974. Theory in Practice: IncreasingProfessional Effectiveness. San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass.
Argyris, C. and Schön, D.A. 1978. Organizational Learning: A Theory ofAction Perspective Columbus, Ohio: Series on Organization Development,Addison-Wesley.
Baker III, J.A., Bowman, F.L., Erwin, G., et al. 2007. The Report of the BPU.S. Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel. Investigation report, USChemical Safety Board (CSB), Washington, D.C. (January 2007), http://sunnyday.mit.edu//Baker-panel-report.pdf.
Baker, D.P., Day, R., and Salas, E. 2006. Teamwork as an EssentialComponent of High-Reliability Organizations. Health Services Research 41 (4 pt 2): 1576-1598. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6773.2006.00566.x.
Bier, V.M. 2001. On the state of the art: risk communication to the public.Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf. 71 (2): 139-150. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0951-8320(00)00090-9.
Cook, T.D. and Campbell, D.T. 1979. Quasi-Experimentation: Design &Analysis Issues for Field Settings. Skokie, Illinois: Rand McNally.
Dawson, D. and Brooks, B.J. 1999. The Esso Longford gas plant accident:Report of the Longford Royal Commission. Melbourne, Australia:Parliamentary paper, Government Printer for the State of Victoria.
Dekker, S. 2006. The Field Guide to Understanding Human Error.Aldershot, Hampshire, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited.
Drottz-Sjöberg, B.-M. (2003). Introduction to risk communication. Currenttrends in risk communication: theory and practice. Oslo, Norway: TheDirectorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning (DSB).
Dyreborg, J. 2009. The causal relation between lead and lag indicators.Saf. Sci. 47 (4): 474-475. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2008.07.015.
Energy Information Administration (EIA). 2010. International Energy Outlook2010. Annual Report No. DOE/EIA-0484(2010), EIA/US DOE, Washington, DC (July2010), http://me.queensu.ca/Courses/430/InternationalEnergyOutlook-summaryonly.pdf.
Fleming, M., Flin, R., Mearns, K., and Gordon, R. 1998. Offshoreworkers' perceptions of risk comparisons with quantitative data. RiskAnal. 18 (1): 103-110.
Grabowski, M. and Roberts, K.H. 1998. Risk Mitigation in VirtualOrganizations. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 3(4). http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1083-6101.1998.tb00082.x.
Graham, B., Reilly, W.K., Beinecke, F., et al. 2011. Deep Water: The GulfOil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling. Report to the President, ,National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and OffshoreDrilling, Washington, DC (January 2011), http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident_FINAL.pdf.
Haddon, W. 1980. The Basic Strategies for Reducing Damage from Hazards ofAll Kinds. Hazard Prevention (September/October): 8-12.
Hance, B.J., Chess, C., and Sandman, P.M. 1988. Improving dialoguewith communities: A risk communication manual for government. Trenton, NewJersey: NJDEP Division of Science & Research.
Health and Safety Executive (HSE). 2006. Developing Process SafetyIndicators. London: Health and Safety Guidance, HSE Books.
Henderson, J., Wright, K., and Brazier, A. 2002. Human factors aspectsof remote operation in process plants. Contract Research Report 432/2002, HSE(Health & Safety Executive), Lancashire, UK (April 2002), http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/crr_pdf/2002/crr02432.pdf.
Holditch, S.A. and Chianelli, R.R. 2008. Factors That Will Influence Oil andGas Supply and Demand in the 21st Century. MRS Bull. 33(April).
Hollnagel, E., Woods, D.D., and Leveson, N. ed. 2006. ResilienceEngineering: Concepts And Precepts. Aldershot, Hampshire, UK: AshgatePublishing Limited.
Hopkins, A. 2007. Thinking About Process Safety Indicators. Paper preparedfor presentation at the Oil and Gas Industry Conference, Manchester, England,5-7 November.
Hudson, P. and van der Graaf, G.C. 2002. Hearts and Minds: The Status After15 Years Research. Paper SPE 73941 presented at the SPE InternationalConference on Health, Safety and Environment in Oil and Gas Exploration andProduction, Kuala Lumpur, 20-22 March. http://dx.doi.org/10.2118/73941-MS.
IAEA. 2000. Operational Safety Performance Indicators for Nuclear PowerPlants. Technical Report, IEAE TECDOC 1141, International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA), Vienna, Austria.
ISO 11064-1:2000, Ergonomic design of control centres--Part 1: Principlesfor the design of control centres. 2000. Geneva, Switzerland: ISO.
ISO 17776:2000, Petroleum and natural gas industries—Offshore productioninstallations—Guidelines on tools and techniques for hazard identification andrisk assessment. 2000. Geneva, Switzerland: ISO.
ISO/IEC Guide 51:1999, Safety Aspects--Guidelines for their Inclusion inStandards. 1999. Geneva, Switzerland: ISO.
Itoh, K., Andersen, H., and Seki, M. 2004. Track maintenance trainoperators' attitudes to job, organisation and management, and their correlationwith accident/incident rate. Cognition, Technology & Work 6 (2): 63-78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10111-003-0135-x.
Jackson, S. and Madni, A.M. 2008. A Practical Framework for the Architectingof Resilient Enterprises. In Proceedings of the third Resilience EngineeringSymposium (October 28-30, 2008, Antibes - Juan-les-Pins, France), Frenchedition, ed. E. Hollnagel, F. Pieri, and E. Riguad. Paris: Collection SciencesÉconomiques, Presses de L'ecole des Mines.
Johnsen, S.O., Ask, R., and Røisli, R. 2008a. Reducing Risk in Oil andGas production. In Critical Infrastructure Protection, ed. E. Goetz andS. Shenoi, No. IFIP WG 11.10, Part II, Chap. 7, 83-98. New York: Seriesin Critical Infrastructure Protection, IFIP/Springer.
Johnsen, S.O. and Håbrekke, S. 2009. Can organisational learning improvesafety and resilience during changes? In Safety, Reliability and RiskAnalysis: Theory, Methods and Applications, ed. S. Martorell, C. GuedesSoares, and J. Barnett, Vol. 1, 805-815. London: Taylor & FrancesGroup.
Johnsen, S.O., Bjørkli, C., Steiro, T., et al. 2008b. CRIOP®: A scenariomethod for Crisis Intervention and Operability analysis. SINTEF Report, ProjectNo. 504017 (ISBN 9788214042962), 2008 revision, SINTEF, Trondheim, Norway https://www.sintef.no/Projectweb/CRIOP/The-CRIOP-handbook/.
Kim, D.H. 2004. The link between individual and organizational learning. InHow Organizations Learn: Managing the Search for Knowledge, secondedition, ed. K. Starkey, S. Tempest, and A. McKinlay. Stamford, Connecticut:Thomson Learning.
Kumar, U. and Ellingsen, H.P. 2000. Development and implementation ofmaintenance performance indicators for the Norwegian oil and gas industry.Proc., 14th International Maintenance Congress (Euro Maintenance 2000),Gothenburg, Sweden, 7-10 March, 221-228.
LaPorte, T.R. and Consolini, P.M. 1991. Working in Practice but Not inTheory: Theoretical Challenges of "High-Reliability Organizations".J-PART 1 (1): 19-48.
Leveson, N.G. 1995. Safeware: System Safety and Computers. Columbus,Ohio: Addison-Wesley Professional.
Lewycky, P. 1987. Notes toward an understanding of accident causes.Hazard Prevention (March/April): 6-8.
Lund, J. and Aarø, L.E. 2004. Accident prevention. Presentation of a modelplacing emphasis on human, structural and cultural factors. Saf. Sci. 42 (4): 271-324. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0925-7535(03)00045-6.
Lundberg, J., Rollenhagen, C., and Hollnagel, E. 2009.What-You-Look-For-Is-What-You-Find - The consequences of underlying accidentmodels in eight accident investigation manuals. Saf. Sci. 47 (10): 1297-1311. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2009.01.004.
MacMillan, J., Paley, M.J., Entin, E.B., and Entin, E.E. 2004.Questionnaires for Distributed Assessment of Team Mutual Awareness. InHandbook of Human Factors and Ergonomics Methods, ed. N.A. Stanton, A.Hedge, K. Brookhuis, and E. Salas, Section IV, 484-494. Boca Raton, Florida:CRC Press.
Mumford, E. 1984. Participation-- from Aristotle to today. In BeyondProductivity: Information Systems Development for OrganizationalEffectiveness, ed. T.M.A. Bemelmans, 95-104. London: InternationalConference Proceedings, Elsevier Science.
Næsje, P. 2009. Effects of Integrated Operations on Offshore Installations'Health and Safety Performance Technical Report SINTEF A12025, SINTEF,Trondheim, Norway (June 2009).
OED. 2004. Om petroleumsvirksomheten. Rapport, Stortingsmelding 38(2003-2004), OLJE--OG Energidepartementet, Oslo, Norway (downloaded 12 March2009), http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/oed/dok/regpubl/stmeld/20032004/Stmeld-nr-38-2003-2004-.html?id=404848.
OED. 2010. Økt utvinning på norsk kontinentalsokkel: En rapport frautvinningsutvalget. Rapport, OLJE--OG Energidepartementet, Oslo, Norway(downloaded 20 January 2011), http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/OED/pdf%20filer/Oktutvinning.pdf.
Øien, K., Utne, I.B., and Herrera, I.A. 2011. Building Safetyindicators: Part 1 - Theoretical foundation. Saf. Sci. 49(2): 148-161. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2010.05.012.
OLF. 2004. The Future of the Norwegian Oil and Gas Industry. OLF Rapport23939, The Norwegian Oil Industry Association (OLF--OljeindustriensLandsforening), Stavanger, Norway (downloaded 08 January 2007).
OLF. 2005. Integrated Work Processes. OLF Rapport, The Norwegian OilIndustry Association (OLF--Oljeindustriens Landsforening), Stavanger, Norway(downloaded 02 January 2010).
Parida, A. 2006. Development of a Multi-criteria Hierarchical Frameworkfor Maintenance Performance Measurement: Concepts, Issues and Challenges.PhD thesis, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Luleå Universityof Technology, Luleå, Sweden.
Perrow, C. 1984. Normal Accidents: Living with High-RiskTechnologies. New York: Basic Books.
Phimister, J.R., Bier, V.M., and Kunreuther, H.C. ed. 2004.Accident Precursor Analysis and Management: Reducing Technological RiskThrough Diligence. Washington, DC: National Academies Press.
Princeton University. 2011. WordNet lexical database,http://wordnet.princeton.edu/ (accessed 04 November 2009).
Rasmussen, J. 1997. Risk management in a dynamic society: a modellingproblem. Saf. Sci. 27 (2-3): 183-213. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0925-7535(97)00052-0.
Ray, P.S., Batson, R.G., Weems, W.H., et al. 2000. Impact of MaintenanceFunction on Plant Safety. Professional Safety (August): Special Report,45-48.
Reason, J.T. 1997. Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents.Aldershot, Hampshire, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited.
Richter, A. 2003. New ways of managing prevention - a cultural approach toparticipation. Safety Science Monitor 7 (1): ArticleII-2.
Roberts, K.H. 1989. New challenges in organizational research: highreliability organizations. Organization & Environment 3(2): 111-125. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/108602668900300202.
Rowan, K.E. 1991. Goals, obstacles, and strategies in risk communication: Aproblem solving approach to improving communication about risks. Journal ofApplied Communication Research 19: 300-329.
Salas, E. and Fiore, S.M. 2004. Team Cognition: Understanding the FactorsThat Drive Process and Performance. Washington, DC: American PsychologicalAssociation.
Thompson, K.M. and Bloom, D.L. 2000. Communication of risk assessmentinformation to risk managers. Journal of Risk Research 3(4): 333-352.
Turner, B. and Pidgeon, N. 1997. Man-Made Disasters, second edition.Woburn, Massachusetts: Butterworth-Heinemann.
Weick, K.E. and Sutcliffe, K.M. 2001. Managing the Unexpected: AssuringHigh Performance in an Age of Complexity. San Francisco, California:University of Michigan Business School Management Series, Jossey-Bass.
Westrum, R. 2003. Removing Latent Pathogenes. Paper presented at the 6thAustralian Aviation Psychologists' Symposium: Setting the Standards, Sydney,Australia, 1 December.
Woods, D.D. and Wreathall, J. 2008. The Stress-Strain Analogy ofOrganizational Resilience. In Remaining Sensitive to the Possibility ofFailure, ed. E. Hollnagel, C. Nemeth, and S. Dekker. Aldershot, Hampshire,UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited.