Why We Don't Learn All We Should From HAZOPs
- Howard J. Duhon (GATE) | Ian Sutton (AMEC Paragon)
- Document ID
- Society of Petroleum Engineers
- SPE Projects, Facilities & Construction
- Publication Date
- June 2010
- Document Type
- Journal Paper
- 104 - 109
- 2010. Society of Petroleum Engineers
- 6.1.2 HSSE Reporting, 4.3.1 Hydrates, 1.10.1 Drill string components and drilling tools (tubulars, jars, subs, stabilisers, reamers, etc), 4.1.5 Processing Equipment, 6.1.5 Human Resources, Competence and Training, 6.1 HSSE & Social Responsibility Management, 4.6 Natural Gas, 6.1.1 HSSE Management Systems
- Environment, Production, Health Safety and Security, Facilities and Construction, Production and Operations, Social Responsibility
- 0 in the last 30 days
- 402 since 2007
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During the last 15 years, the process industries have made dramatic improvements in occupational safety. Recordable injury rates have dropped by close to an order of magnitude (Pitlblado 2008). Accurate information pertaining to progress in process safety in the same time period is not available. However, it is likely that improvements in process safety are not nearly so great (Sutton 2010).
From its beginnings in the late 1980s and early 1990s, hazards analysis has been a key item in all process safety programs. After all, if hazards are not identified, they cannot be remediated. Of the various hazards-analysis techniques, the Hazard and Operability Method (HAZOP) has probably gained the greatest acceptance. Therefore, if the process industries are to achieve the same levels of success in process safety as they have in occupational-safety improvements, the effective use of HAZOPs is probably going to be of central importance.
This paper discusses some of the cognitive, social, organizational, and procedural factors that limit the effectiveness of projects in general and of HAZOPs in particular. From this discussion, insights can be developed that can provide ideas for improving the HAZOP process and process-safety-management systems in general.
|File Size||154 KB||Number of Pages||6|
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